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Abstract
Television (TV), the predominant advertising medium, is being transformed by the micro-targeting
capabilities of set-top boxes (STBs). By procuring impressions at the STB level (often denoted pro-
grammatic television), advertisers can now lower per-exposure costs and/or reach viewers most respon-
sive to advertising creatives. Accordingly, this paper uses a proprietary, household-level, single-source
data set to develop an instantaneous show and advertisement viewing model to forecast consumers’
exposure to advertising and the downstream consequences for impressions and sales.
Viewing data suggest person-specific factors dwarf brand- or show-specific factors in explaining
advertising avoidance, thereby suggesting that device-level advertising targeting can be more effective
than existing show-level targeting. Consistent with this observation, the model indicates that micro-
targeting lowers advertising costs and raises incremental profits considerably relative to show-level
targeting. Further, these advantages are amplified when advertisers are allowed to buy real-time as
opposed to up-front.
Keywords: TV advertising, targeting, set-top box, sampling, programmatic television
Television (TV) is the most prominent modality for the transmission and reception of video content. Ac-
cording to Nielsen’s total audience report (Nielsen 2016), American adults spend about 4 hours and 39
minutes watching traditional TV each day, far exceeding the combined daily consumption of PCs, smart-
phones, and tablets. Despite fierce competition from digital advertising, TV advertising is still huge and
growing. eMarketer forecasts that TV spending will be $71.29 billion by the end of 2016 (eMarketer
2016). One of the key advantages of Internet advertising has been its ability to target households. How-
ever, with the proliferation of digital set-top boxes (STBs), video recorders (DVRs) that enable advertisers
to target households, this advantage is eroding. It is estimated that the number of US households reachable
by addressable TV ads is now 68 million. Annual revenues for so-called “programmatic TV” advertising
were $300 million in 2015 with an astonishing 100% year-over-year growth in revenues (Urbanski 2016),
and the Wall Street Journal reports the market will soon reach $100 billion (Bruell 2017).
The digital targeting of advertising on television is transformative in two regards. First, digital TV
affords household-level measures of TV viewing, making it possible to better forecast household advertis-
ing exposure. Second, set-top boxes enable household-show level targeting, enhancing targeting precision.
While improving the cost efficiency of advertising exposures is of interest in its own right, coupling set-
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top viewing data with purchase data can also be used to evaluate the profitability of ad campaigns at the
household-show level.
As a result, several companies have already started offering targeted TV advertising solutions. For in-
stance, TiVo Research and Analytics, Inc. (TRA) developed a software platform “Media TRAnalytics®”,
which combines household-level TV tuning and purchase data to help advertisers achieve higher return on
investment (ROI). Similarly, Nielsen Catalina Solutions launched “AdVantics on Demand (TM)”, which
helps advertisers achieve better targeting based on retail purchase data, and NBCUniversal announced the
launch of its Audience Targeting Platform (ATP), which will use viewing and purchase histories to iden-
tify client-specific inventory across NBCUniversal’s portfolio of national broadcast and cable networks.
Axciom TV, launched in January of 2016, enables advertisers to combine first- and third-party data with
TV viewing information to target advertising on TV. In a venture called Open AP, Viacom, 21st Century
Fox, and Time Warner are coordinating to standardize programmatic advertising purchasing.
In response to these evolving advances in digital TV, our goal is to use set-top data to model house-
holds’ instantaneous TV and advertising consumption behavior and integrate the model with purchase
data in order to propose ways for advertisers to improve their targeting profitability. We consider several
questions. First, how do viewers1 make TV and advertising consumption decisions, and are viewing data
informative about these choices? Second, are set-top advertising exposures informative about purchase
behaviors? Last, what are the implications of these advertising and purchase consumption decisions for
micro-targeting advertisements on TV? To answer these questions, we combine panel data on TV view-
ing, consumer purchase-behavior panels, advertising campaign information, advertising rates, TV program
descriptors, TV program ratings, and advertising rates.
With regard to TV and advertising consumption, we document a number of stylized facts about viewing
in order to inform our modeling choices. For example, 85% of households watch prime-time TV every
night, on average watching 88% of the prime-time hours. Thus, any gains from targeting largely arise
from what a viewer watches rather than whether they watch. Once a viewing session commences, 30%
of households sample multiple shows prior to selecting one to view, suggesting that show sampling is
informative about viewing preferences. Once a show is selected, 60% of viewers watch a show to its
conclusion, indicating ad exposure is common once a show is selected. Within a show, we find that
1We use the terms “household” and “viewer” interchangeably.
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viewers’ advertising avoidance is more common when the show is recorded (79% vs 15%). Person-specific
factors explain most of the variation in advertising avoidance (20.4%). The person-specific variation
dwarfs the variation explained by genre (.7%), brand (.3%), time (.0%), and category (.0%). This variance
decomposition suggests the potential for significant returns to household-level advertising targeting, and
that targeting on genres and time will have smaller effects on advertising avoidance.
Using these insights to develop an integrated model of viewing predicated on a single consumption util-
ity framework, we capture the show sampling, show viewing, and show exit processes described above.
The approach builds upon Arcidiacono et al. (2015)’s continuous time dynamic discrete choice mod-
els, which we extend by incorporating sampling/consideration behavior. Factors playing a major role in
show consumption utility include its length, genre, network, familiarity, and offset. When consumers
encounter an advertisement in these shows, we again draw upon this concept of consumption utility to
predict whether consumers will avoid an advertisement. Results suggest advertising utility is lower when
the prior advertisement is avoided and in reality and drama genres, and the utility is higher in the first slot
of a commercial break.
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Sethuraman, Tellis, and Briesch 2011), we observe small, but
generally positive advertising effects on purchase behavior. Across 129 ad campaigns spanning multi-
ple categories and consumer segments, we find 15% evidence positive advertising effects at a statistical
significance level of 5%. Of note, we find variation across consumers in their responsiveness to adver-
tising, suggesting that set-top data, coupled with purchase information, can be exploited to target those
households most responsive to advertising.
With regard to the micro-targeting of advertisements, we consider: 1) whether an advertiser seeks to
minimize the costs of its target advertising exposures or to maximize its incremental profit from adver-
tising; and 2) whether the advertising purchase is made in advance or in real-time. The advantage of
cost-based targeting is that it is predicated upon only advertising viewership, and does not require a model
of sales response to advertising. However, cost-based targeting ignores the link between advertising and
sales, and thus the profitability of a campaign. The advantage of real-time advertising is knowing what
a viewer is watching, so it does not need a TV-show viewing model. Advance purchase, or “up-front,”
is the current norm in TV advertising sales, but with the increased potential for firms to buy advertising
real-time, like on the Internet, real-time buying is becoming increasingly relevant. With advance buy, we
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find that it is possible to lower costs per target ad view by over 90%. With real-time buy, it is further
possible to lower target costs per view while concurrently increasing target views; in one schedule, views
to the target households can be increased by 47% while concurrently reducing costs by 7%. In short, we
document dramatic increases in the cost efficiency of targeted media buys. Likewise, we find that adver-
tisers can improve their advertising profitability when real-time ad buys are enabled. The effect is smaller
for advance buys because uncertainty about advertising exposures attenuates advertising response, making
advertising less profitable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant liter-
ature. We then describe TV-viewing behavior to motivate the viewing model presented in the following
section. Subsequently, we discuss estimation and describe the estimation results. Based on these results
and a purchase model, we conduct counterfactual policy experiments and evaluate potential gain to be
realized from targeting. Finally, we conclude with a schedule of next steps.
RELEVANT LITERATURE
In this section, we detail how this research relates to the literature on television viewing, ad viewing, and
ad targeting. Since Lehmann (1971)’s seminal work, a rich body of literature has identified various factors
affecting viewers’ utility from watching TV programs. Such factors include viewer demographics (Rust
and Alpert 1984; Anand and Shachar 2011), program genre (Rust and Alpert 1984; Anand and Shachar
2011), cast demographics (Shachar and Emerson 2000; Wilbur 2008), advertising time (Wilbur 2008),
viewer’s previous program choices (Moshkin and Shachar 2002), and a spouse’s choice (Yang, Narayan,
and Assael 2006). Collectively, this line of literature suggests that person, show, and time factors explain
substantial variation in show viewing. Accordingly, we integrate these various factors into a household-
level viewing model.
Conditional on watching TV shows, viewers inevitably encounter commercial breaks, which often
trigger zapping (i.e., channel switching, leaving the room, etc.), and in the case of recorded shows, zip-
ping (i.e., fast-forwarding). Hence, a second related stream of literature looks into viewers’ advertising
avoidance behavior, and has identified various viewer- and ad-specific factors that affect such behavior.
Identified viewer-specific factors include household category purchase history (Siddarth and Chattopad-
hyay 1998) and the media weight of a campaign (i.e., the number of times that a household had previously
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been exposed to a commercial) (Gustafson and Siddarth 2007). Identified ad-specific factors include the
frequency of the commercial (Siddarth and Chattopadhyay 1998), length and content of the commercial
(Siddarth and Chattopadhyay 1998), program genre (Schweidel and Kent 2010), and commercial loca-
tion (Gustafson and Siddarth 2007), as well as the congruity between the commercial and the program
(Furnham and Price 2006).
Finally, given our goal to explore the potential of micro-targeting in TV advertising, this work also
relates to the growing literature in advertising targeting. A number of papers have examined why and how
targeted TV advertising works from a theoretical point of view (Gal-Or et al. 2006; Anand and Shachar
2009). A few papers address the issue of geographically or demographically targeted TV advertising from
an empirical point of view (Anand and Shachar 2011; Lovett and Peress 2015). Our focus is instead tar-
geting at more granular levels, i.e., the individual household. Finer targeting affords better opportunities
to incorporate individual households’ past viewing and purchase data in targeting decisions. In this re-
gard, the most closely related study is Tuchman, Nair, and Gardete (2016), who explore implications of
individual-level targeting to consumers who are less likely to avoid the targeted advertisements and have
a positive marginal advertising effect on purchase. One key point of departure in our analysis is that we
model instantaneous show viewing, which enables us to forecast whether an advertisement is viewed at
a given point in time. A second point of difference is that we consider not only which advertisements
to target to whom, but in which show and at what time. This requires a model of show and advertising
viewing behavior.
DATA
Micro-targeting in TV is facilitated by historical viewing and purchase data at the household level. We
first overview these sources of the household-level viewing and purchase data in the subsection entitled
“Data Description”. Next, we describe the TV program viewing data and the advertising viewing data to
generate insights regarding household viewing behavior (in the subsection entitled “Empirical Regularities
in TV Viewing”) that help to form the basis of our viewing model.
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Data Description
Several sets of data are integrated for this study, including 1) set-top box usage data, 2) purchase data,
3) advertising data, 4) programming data, and 5) Nielsen TV viewing data. The combination of 1) – 4)
is often called single-source data because it covers the entire TV viewing and purchase experience for a
set of households. The set-top box data (TiVo log files) track each household’s complete usage of a TiVo
set-top box and therefore all viewing behavior. The purchase data are from Information Resources Incor-
porated (IRI), and contain each household’s store visits and purchase history in 77 consumer packaged
goods (CPG) categories, as well as store causal data. The advertising data are obtained from TNS Media
Research, and include the timing and advertising costs for national TV advertisements airing within the
duration of the data. The TNS data are supplemented with national viewing data from AC Nielsen in order
to normalize shows’ advertising rates to the exposure level. The programming data come from Tribune
Media Services (TMS) and contain information on popular TV programs. The set-top box data, advertis-
ing data, and programming data will be used to estimate the viewing model. The Nielsen TV viewing data
contain rating information and advertising rates (costs). The purchase data and the Nielsen data will be
used along with viewing model estimates in policy experiments on targeting.
TiVo log files (show and advertising viewing). The viewing data are from a field study conducted by
IRI, TiVo, and a consortium of major CPG manufacturers (see Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Mela (2010) for
a detailed description of the field study). The TiVo log files track each household’s moment-by-moment
usage of a TiVo set-top box. They record every keystroke of the set-top box as well as all TV content
viewed and whether it was live or recorded. Among other things, the keystrokes are used to determine
which content was fast-forwarded. We use data in the period of July 2005 – July 2006, keeping the 834
households that have both viewing and purchase information.
IRI datasets (purchase). The panel data used to link with TV viewing and advertising exposure data
are provided by IRI and include purchase data, trip data, and store data in the period of June 2005 – June
2006.2
2The starting and ending date of the IRI datasets are both earlier than those respective dates for the three datasets related to
TV viewing. All datasets intersect during the period of July 2005 – June 2006. We retain the IRI data in June 2005, one month
before the start of the TV data, in order to initialize behavioral measures such as last brand purchased. We retain the TV data in
July 2006, one month after the end of the IRI data, for hold-out validation and policy experiments.
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The first component, the IRI purchase panel data, contains the purchase history for panelists in 77 cate-
gories. Organized by panelist-category-item-transaction time, the data include store, item, item attributes,
price, and promotional status (display or feature).
The second component, the IRI trip panel data, records panelists’ store visits. Organized by panelist-
transaction time, the data include the store visited and total amount spent. Combined with the purchase
panel data, these store visit data enable us to infer non-purchases, defined as no purchase in a category on
a given store visit.
The third component, the IRI store causal data, reports store sales for each item sold in the 57 stores.
Organized by store-week-item, the data include weekly price, promotional status (display or feature), and
units sold. By matching these data with transactions in the purchase panel data and store visits in the trip
panel data, we can construct a choice set with associated causal variables for each purchase occasion.
TNS advertising schedule data (advertising exposures, creative execution, and prices). The TNS
advertising schedule data describe advertising schedules for 61 national broadcast and cable TV networks.
For each advertisement, the data report the precise air time, network, length, attributes of the advertised
product (e.g., product category, company, and brand), name and genre of the associated show, location
of the commercial break within the show (i.e., pod) and the slot within the break (i.e., pod location or
slot), and the estimated price of the advertisement. We infer advertising exposures by noting the time and
network of the advertisement, and assessing whether or not the network was viewed at that time.
The data also contain a brief description of the advertisement, which is a summary of the creative
execution for the advertisement (e.g., “mega roll/bear changes role” for Charmin bathroom tissue). A
creative execution is often run for several weeks and is used to analyze advertising response. In the
subsection entitled “Advertising Response”, we will consider the effect of dropping a particular advertising
creative on sales.
Nielsen TV viewing data. As advertising rates furnished by TNS are at the show level, they do not yield
a per-impression cost. As micro-targeting is at the impression level, we translate the show cost to an expo-
sure cost, and do so by collecting information on advertising exposures. Specifically, we supplement the
TNS advertising schedule data with Nielsen ratings to obtain per-exposure price for each advertisement.
The Nielsen ratings are manually collected from Broadcasting & Cable magazine and report the audience
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size of top TV programs on broadcast networks. We collect these data in July 2006, the period during
which the policy experiments are run. These data include 376 shows on four networks: ABC, CBS, NBC,
and FOX.
TMS data (program characteristics). TMS data contain descriptive information (e.g., program name,
genre, cast, plot description) for 55,684 programs accounting for 90% of the TiVo viewing observations
related to the top 27 TV networks (six broadcast networks and 21 cable networks). Each observation in
the TiVo Log Files is tagged with a unique TMS identifier, which is used to match with the TMS data,
resulting in a description of each show viewed.
Empirical Regularities in TV Viewing
This section reports a descriptive analysis of TV viewing both to illustrate the nature of the data and to
motivate the ensuing model. Households’ viewing behavior can be described by a series of conditional
decisions, and we organize the discussion along this progression of conditional decisions (watch TV,
sample shows, watch or record shows, watch advertisements, exit show/exit TV).
Watching TV. Owing to the observation that most viewing (and advertising spending) takes place in
prime time (defined in our analysis as 8 p.m. – midnight local standard time), our ensuing analyses focus
upon this daypart. Panel a of Figure 1 shows most households watch TV most evenings: on average,
households watch prime-time TV on 85% of the days in the sample. Panel b of Figure 1 further depicts
the hours of prime-time TV viewing across household-days, conditional on watching TV. Over 75% of the
household-day viewing time exceeds three hours.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Show sampling and viewing. When starting to watch TV, a household first chooses which show to watch
from amongst the live, broadcast shows and the inventory of recorded shows available on the set-top box.
Due to incomplete knowledge of program and episode quality, households sample shows (either live or
recorded) for a brief duration to decide whether to watch (Esteves-Sorenson and Perretti 2012). After
viewing the show for a short period of time, the household can decide whether to continue watching,
sample another show, or exit. If another show is sampled, the process repeats.
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To characterize the process of show sampling, we define the “show completion rate” as the ratio of
the time a show is actually viewed relative to its total broadcast length. Panel c of Figure 1 illustrates
that completion rate is bimodal: it tends to be either very low or very high. This dichotomy is consistent
with a process wherein people first sample a set of shows and then proceed to watch the one that is liked.
Truncating the non-views and the completed views (the endpoints in Figure 1 panel c) enables us to zoom
in on the sampling behavior (Figure 1 panel d). It suggests a power law with most sampling not exceeding
a few minutes per show.3
Further illustration of the apparent sampling process requires a definition of sampling events. Because
excessively short viewing durations (e.g., 30 seconds or less) likely reflect channel “surfing” (i.e., using
the up or down button to shift channels), a sampling duration is defined to be 30 seconds or longer. To
obtain the threshold that differentiates watching from sampling, we collect one-hour shows watched from
the broadcast start time, and compute the hazard rate (i.e., the fraction of surviving viewers that leave)
by time into show (Figure 1, panel e).4 The hazard rate decreases drastically within the first 3 minutes,
and remains relatively stable afterwards. Similar patterns are observed for half-hour shows. Therefore,
we categorize viewing durations between 30 seconds and 3 minutes as sampling events (a definition we
use through the subsequent paper).5 Based on this categorization, panel f of Figure 1 indicates that in
70% of the cases a household decides to watch the first show sampled. Hence, sampling is informative of
preferences.
In sum, the data suggest that the frequency of prime-time viewing is high, that households spend
considerable time watching in the evening, and when viewing they tend to sample shows until finding one
of interest. With this characterization of show viewing in mind, we turn to the recording decision.
Show recording. Households can record shows in any given day. Across households and days, 3% of
the household-day observations are associated with recording only, 53% are associated with viewing only,
and 44% are associated with both viewing and recording. Hence, recording is common.
3The small spike at 50% occurs because people watching a one-hour show might exit in the middle to watch another show
that just started, as most shows start or end around the hour or the half hour.
4The show-switching spikes in panel e of Figure 1 are coincident with the starting times of shows on other networks. 69.2%
of all shows start on the hour, and 26.9% start on the half hour, comprising the bulk of starting times. However, shows also
commence at 5 minutes, 15 minutes, 20 minutes, 35 minutes, 40 minutes, and 45 minutes after the hour, with respective
percentages of .18%, .31%, .14%, 1.16%, .18%, and .37%.
5A sensitivity analysis on sampling the threshold duration using alternative lower bounds of 10 seconds, 20 seconds, and 60
seconds indicates the number of shows sampled varies less than ±7% relative to the current 30-second threshold.
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The TiVo set-top box’s storage capacity was able to store 40 hours of programming. Set-top box
program inventories are near capacity (> 90%) on most (82%) household-day pairs in the data, imply-
ing households usually have to delete one show before recording another. These recording and deletion
decisions are therefore informative about relative show preferences.
Advertising viewing. Advertising viewership is predicated on the series of decisions shown in Figure 2.
First, advertising viewing requires one to be watching the show when the advertisement airs (a viewer is
exposed). Second, a household must decide whether to watch a show live or recorded. As most viewing is
live, 78% of all advertising exposures are live. Third, when confronted with an advertisement, a household
can decide to avoid it. Complete avoidance occurs when a fast-forward starts before the advertisement and
ends after it. Partial avoidance occurs when the household starts or stops fast-forwarding (i.e., zipping)
during the advertisement and/or switches channels into or out of the advertisement (i.e., zapping). While
zapping occurs in both live and recorded shows, zipping can only occur in recorded or near-live shows
(i.e., when the current channel’s broadcast is automatically recorded by TiVo). As expected, recorded
shows are more subject to avoidance, as evidenced by the nearly 80% avoidance rate (mostly zipping) for
recorded shows and a lower than 15% avoidance rate (mostly zapping) for live or near-live shows.
[Figure 2 about here.]
To further exemplify avoidance patterns in recorded shows, we depict in Figure 3 the timing of zips
and commercial breaks during a one-hour-long recorded episode of “CSI: Crime Scene Investigation” on
December 8, 2005. Figure 3 indicates zips coincide with commercial breaks.6 Similar patterns exist in
other shows. The figure suggests that advertising avoidance is not uncommon, but that when watching
recorded shows, viewership tends to return to the same level after the commercial break.
[Figure 3 about here.]
To ascertain the factors that explain variation in prime-time advertising avoidance from zipping, we
conduct a variance decomposition with the following explanatory variables: household, brand, show genre,
network, product category, location of the commercial break within the show (i.e., pod) and the slot within
6Zipping durations exceed the durations of the national advertising breaks because the TNS advertising schedule data do
not include local cable advertisements or advertisements for upcoming cable network programs (“promos” or “tune-ins”) and
these are aired at the beginning or the end of the commercial break (Wilbur, Xu, and Kempe 2013).
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the break (i.e., pod position or slot), day of the week, hour, and past avoidance (Table 1). If all the variation
in skipping can be apportioned to shows or time, then standard aggregate methods of targeting based on
purchasing slots in shows should be effective tools to address avoidance. If, in contrast, there remains
substantial household-specific variation, then the efficacy of micro-targeting is amplified.
We find the latter to be the case. The factors incorporated in the model account for 34.5% of the overall
variance in advertising viewing and skipping. Most importantly, household-fixed effects account for 59.1%
of the explained variance. Moreover, demographic variables alone are not sufficient in explaining the
variation. If household-fixed effects are replaced by a set of demographic variables, the total explained
variance drops from 34.5% to 27.8%, and observed demographic variables account for only 11.4% of the
explained variance. All in all, these results suggest demographic-based advertising buys can be augmented
with household-specific advertising avoidance information.
[Table 1 about here.]
Advertising costs. Table 2 provides summary statistics of per-exposure price for 15-second advertising
slots for the shows discussed in the subsection entitled “Nielsen TV Viewing Data”. The median per-
exposure price is about 1 cent for ABC, CBS, and NBC, and is slightly above 1 cent for FOX. Moderate
price variation also exists within each network.
[Table 2 about here.]
To ascertain whether advertising prices relate to viewership, we regress the advertisements’ prices (in
$1,000 units) on ratings and network dummies. Results indicate a positive and significant relationship
between price and rating (est = 7.8, se = .9); and the network coefficient is the highest for FOX (est =
32.9, se = 3.6), followed in turn by CBS (est = 25.3, se = 4.7), NBC (est = 16.8, se = 4.0), and ABC (est =
12.7, se = 3.6). Presumably the differences across networks relate to the demographics of the shows
viewed (e.g., Goettler 2012).
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TV VIEWING MODEL
Summary of Model Components
This summary overviews the various model components used in our targeting analysis. First, we consider
the television and advertising viewing model. This modeling component enables us to predict advertis-
ing views. Second, we consider the advertising response model in the subsection entitled “Advertising
Response”. This modeling component enables us to link advertising views to sales. Combined, the first
two model components enable us to ascertain how changes in advertising buys affect sales. Third, using
the link between advertising response and costs, we conduct counterfactual targeting analyses in order to
improve the efficiency of media buys. This modeling component is discussed in the subsection entitled
“Targeting Approaches”. Figure 4 overviews these model components and enumerates data requirements.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The Viewing Model Overview
The TV viewing model comprises three components motivated by the preceding empirical discussion:
TV show sampling and watching (in the subsection entitled “TV Show Viewing”), TV show recording
(in the subsection entitled “TV Show Recording”), and advertising viewing (in the subsection entitled
“TV Advertising Viewing”). All three components are predicated upon the theoretical concept of flow
utility, that is, the moment-by-moment consumption benefit a viewer derives from watching a TV show,
advertisement, or non-TV activity (the outside good). In this flow utility framework, viewers derive utility
from viewing a show, but experience ex-ante uncertainty about the flow utility of TV shows they are
considering. For instance, prior to tuning into an episode of a show, viewers might be uncertain about the
storyline, the role of a favorite actor, whether the show is rerun, and so forth. This uncertainty induces
viewers to sample shows prior to viewing them, watching a candidate show for a short time (sampling)
to learn about its quality, eventually settling in on a show when the expected benefit of sampling another
show is lower than the effort involved in sampling it.
At random points after choosing a show to watch, the flow utility of the show changes (for example,
with a new scene or show segment), and the viewer evaluates whether to continue watching the show
or sample anew. Likewise, when advertisements are encountered, consumption utility suddenly changes,
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again leading to the potential for viewers to tune away or fast forward. Eventually, viewing sessions
conclude at the end of the evening, or when the consumption utility falls short of the outside good.
We first introduce the three flow utilities (show, advertisement, and outside good) (in the subsection
entitled “Flow Utilities”). Based on these flow utilities, we then describe the viewer choice process (show
sampling, show viewing, show recording, and advertising viewing) in the subsections entitled “TV Show
Viewing”, “TV Show Recording”, and “TV Advertising Viewing” that follow.
Flow Utilities
We model flow utilities of TV shows, TV advertisements, and the outside good. All utilities are viewer-
specific.
Show utility. Each show can be represented by a unique combination of t (time) and n (network). The
flow utility that viewer i derives from show tn is defined as:
uSitn = X
S
itnβ
S
i +ν
S
itn + ε
S
itn(1)
≡ u¯Sitn +νSitn + εSitn,
where XSitn is a vector that captures show characteristics and viewer i’s past viewing behavior, including
genre, network, show length, the percent of show aired when sampling begins (i.e., viewing offset), the
number of previous episodes of the program that the viewer has sampled in the preceding week, and
whether the viewer was watching network n before the current choice occasion. The last two capture state
dependence in viewing behavior. νSitn represents a viewer-show specific error term observed by the viewer
but not by the researcher. εSitn represents viewer uncertainty pertaining to program and episode quality
prior to sampling that is revealed to the viewer only after sampling the show. We assume νSitn is i.i.d.
standard Type I Extreme Value distributed, and εSitn is i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value distributed with mean
zero.
Advertisement utility. Each advertisement insertion can also be represented by a unique combination of
t (time) and n (network). The flow utility that viewer i obtains from advertisement tn is a function of the
characteristics of the advertisement, XAitn, and is given by:
uAitn = X
A
itnβ
A
i + ε
A
itn(2)
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≡ u¯Aitn + εAitn,
where XAitn includes: pod, pod position (slot), genre of the associated show, product category, and
whether the preceding advertisement is avoided. εAitn is an idiosyncratic error term affecting the inherent
valuation of advertisement tn (conditional on exposure), and it is observed by the viewer but not by the
researcher. We assume εAitn to be i.i.d. standard Type I Extreme Value distributed.
Outside good utility. When allocating time, the viewer contrasts the utility from viewing TV to the best
available alternative (i.e., the outside good). If the utility from viewing TV exceeds that of the outside
good, the viewer will watch TV. As such, the flow utility of the outside good is tantamount to the “oppor-
tunity cost” of time, posited to vary by viewer (i) and time (t), and denoted as:
uOit = X
O
it β
O
i +ν
O
it(3)
≡ u¯Oit +νOit ,
where XOit is a vector of observable day characteristics specific to viewer i and time t. These characteristics
include weekday fixed effects and indicators for previous day TV viewing and previous weekday TV
viewing. Monthly fixed effects are added to control for seasonality. νOit is an idiosyncratic error term
affecting the utility from the outside good at time t, and is observed by the viewer but not by the researcher.
We assume νOit to be i.i.d. standard Type I Extreme Value distributed and is i.i.d. with ν
S
itn (∀n).
TV Show Viewing
Owing to εSitn in Equation 1, viewers face ex-ante uncertainty in the utility of viewing that can only be
resolved by sampling a show (that is, a brief viewing of the show). We assume that a viewer first samples
the alternative with the highest ex-ante expected viewing utility given the observed show characteristics
and νSitn, the shock unobserved to the researcher. This ordering of alternatives is simple for the viewers to
do (suggesting the process is a parsimonious representation) and is also consistent with the optimal search
ordering implied by Weitzman (1979) and Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) when uncertainty
is large relative to search costs. After the short exposure to the show, the viewer observes the utility shock
for that show, εSitn, and makes the decision whether to continue watching by comparing the flow utility of
this show with the expected highest flow utility to be obtained from other shows available at that time (for
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which the εSitn′ at the other shows tn
′ is still unknown to the viewer). If the flow utility of the current show
is lower, the viewer samples other shows.
If the flow utility of the current show is higher than the expected best remaining alternative, the viewer
selects the show and enters a “flow” state of watching. During this flow state, the flow utility of the show
remains constant until an external “shock” randomly arrives that changes the flow utility by perturbing
εSitn. Such a perturbation might reflect a change in a story on a news show, for example. When this occurs,
a new error is drawn in the flow utility model in Equation 1. If the resulting flow utility is lower, the
viewer compares this new utility to the expected highest flow utility that could be obtained from switching
to another show or the outside good. If these alternatives yield higher utility, the viewer switches. An
analogous process holds for advertising. When an advertisement appears in the midst of the show, the flow
utility changes to that of the advertisement, and the viewer again compares the flow utility to other options.
Figure 5 overviews this process and the sections of the paper that elaborate on the show sampling and
viewing decisions (while the ad viewing process is described in the subsection entitled “TV Advertising
Viewing”). In this figure, the εSitn is revealed in the “Sample show” step.
[Figure 5 about here.]
We elaborate on the sampling and viewing processes next.
Sampling. Viewers sample shows to ascertain whether the flow utility is likely to exceed that of other
options. At time t, the set of available shows to be sampled consists of all current live programs and the
current menu of recorded programs. The viewer starts by sampling the show with the highest expected flow
utility. Prior to the viewer observing εSitn (∀n), the expected flow utility of show tn is u¯Sitn +νSitn +E
(
εSitn
)
.
As the εSitn (∀n) are i.i.d. distributed with mean zero, E
(
εSitn
)
is equal across shows and the sampling
decision is therefore incumbent upon u¯Sitn + ν
S
itn. Show tn is sampled if u¯
S
itn + ν
S
itn > u¯
S
itn′ + ν
S
itn′,∀n′ and
u¯Sitn +ν
S
itn > u¯
O
it +ν
O
it . Under the assumption that ν
S
itn (∀n) and νOit in Equations 1 and 3 are i.i.d. standard
Type I Extreme Value distributed, this probability is given by:
(4) Pr
(
ySitn = 1
)
=
exp
(
u¯Sitn
)
exp
(
u¯Oit
)
+∑n′ exp
(
u¯Sitn′
) ,
where ySitn is an indicator that show tn is sampled by viewer i.
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After sampling show tn, viewer i observes εSitn and therefore u
S
itn. The viewer then compares u
S
itn with
the expected highest flow utility (i.e., the inclusive value) to be obtained from the remaining non-sampled
shows available at that time and the outside good:
IVitNit |
{
νSitn
}
n ,ν
O
it = E{εSitn′}n′∈Nit
maxn′∈Nit
{
u¯Sitn′+ν
S
itn′+ ε
S
itn′, u¯
O
it +ν
O
it
}
= max
{
u¯Oit +ν
O
it , ln
(
∑
n′∈Nit
exp
(
u¯Sitn′+ν
S
itn′
))}
,
whereNit denotes the set of networks at time t that has yet to be sampled.
If uitn ≥ IVitNit , viewer i watches the show. The probability of this event is given by:
Pr
(
yWitn = 1 | ySitn = 1,
{
νSitn
}
n
,νOit
)
(5)
= Pr
(
uSitn ≥ IVitNit |
{
νSitn
}
n
,νOit
)
= 1−FεSitn
(
max
{
u¯Oit +ν
O
it , ln
(
∑
n′∈Nit
exp
(
u¯Sitn′+ν
S
itn′
))}
− u¯Sitn−νSitn
)
,
where yWitn is an indicator that viewer i watches show tn, and FεSitn (·) denotes the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of εSitn.
Computation of Pr
(
yWitn = 1 | ySitn = 1
)
involves integrating out
{
νSitn
}
n and ν
O
it in
Pr
(
yWitn = 1 | ySitn = 1,
{
νSitn
}
n ,ν
O
it
)
. The sampling order implies νSitn′ and ν
O
it in Equation 5 are
truncated respectively below u¯Sitn +ν
S
itn− u¯Sitn′ and below u¯Sitn +νSitn− u¯Oit .
If uSitn < IVitNit , viewer i samples another show if the inclusive value of remaining shows is higher than
the value of the outside good. The choice set is now ˜Nit =Nit \n, and the probability of sampling show
tn˜ (n˜ ∈ ˜Nit) is:
(6) Pr
(
ySitn˜ = 1
)
=
exp
(
u¯Sitn˜
)
exp
(
u¯Oit
)
+∑n′∈ ˜Nit exp
(
u¯Sitn′
) .
The sampling process repeats until either the viewer identifies a show that is worth watching (in which
case the viewer watches the show), or the value of the outside good exceeds the inclusive value of remain-
ing shows (in which case the viewer ends the viewing session).
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Watching. Upon selecting show tn to view, viewer i obtains viewing flow utility uSitn until the show ends
or the viewer exits viewing, whichever comes first. The decision to stop watching is driven by arrival of
external shocks that change the flow utility (Arcidiacono et al. 2015; Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2013).
If the external shock is sufficiently negative, the viewer terminates the show. This characterization of the
show exiting decision is in essence similar to the First-Hitting-Time (FHT) models (Lee and Whitmore
2006).
Specifically, at some time t ′ > t, viewer i encounters an external shock εSit ′n (e.g., change in plot,
actor, or scene), which replaces εSitn and changes the flow utility of show tn from u¯
S
itn + ν
S
itn + ε
S
itn to
u¯Sitn + ν
S
itn + ε
S
it ′n. If this new flow utility falls below the inclusive value of remaining alternatives, the
viewer will exit the show.
To characterize the duration until the arrival of a new external shock, we assume a homogeneous
Poisson process with rate λitn for viewer i and show tn. λitn is parameterized as a function of genre:
(7) λitn = exp(gtnρi) ,
where gtn is a row vector on genre, the jth element being an indicator variable of whether show tn is of
the jth genre.
Under this Poisson assumption, the probability of viewer i exiting show tn at time t ′, qitnt ′ , is given by
the probability that the flow utility upon receiving a new viewing shock falls below the alternative options:
qitnt ′ |
{
νSitn
}
n
,νOit(8)
= Pr
(
u¯Sitn +ν
S
itn + ε
S
it ′n < max
{
u¯Oit +ν
O
it , ln
(
∑
n′∈Nit′
exp
(
u¯Sit ′n′+ν
S
it ′n′
))})
= FεS
it′n
(
max
{
u¯Oit +ν
O
it , ln
(
∑
n′∈Nit′
exp
(
u¯Sit ′n′+ν
S
it ′n′
))}
− u¯Sitn−νSitn
)
.
Computation of qitnt ′ involves integrating out
{
νSitn
}
n and ν
O
it in qitnt ′ |
{
νSitn
}
n ,ν
O
it . qitnt ′ is not neces-
sarily fixed through the duration of show tn, and can alter when available shows on alternative networks
(Nit ′) change. For instance, when a new show t ′n′ starts on network n′, u¯Sit ′n′ + ν
S
it ′n′ changes and qitnt ′
would change accordingly. Hence, qitnt ′ is piecewise constant and changes whenever shows on alternative
networks (Nit ′) change. Note that in between shocks, qitnt ′ remains fixed.
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Using an approach similar to Arcidiacono et al. (2015) and Nevskaya and Albuquerque (2013), Web
Appendix B shows for qitnt ′ that is piecewise constant with segment 1, ...,M, the CDF of the viewing length
l?itn is:
(9) Fl?itn (t¯)≡ Pr{l?itn ≤ t¯}= 1− e−λitn∑
M
m=1 l
m
itnq
m
itn,
where qmitn is the exiting probability in segment m, and l
m
itn is the length of segment m up to time t¯,
∑Mm=1 lmitn = t¯.
The probability density function of l?itn is therefore:
fl?itn (t¯) = λitnq
m¯
itne
−λitn∑Mm=1 lmitnqmitn,(10)
where m¯ is the segment that t¯ falls into.
As it is not possible to watch the show past its end,
(11) lWitn = min(l
?
itn,Litn) ,
where lWitn is the time viewer i spends watching show tn, and Litn is the remaining length of show tn when
sampled.
TV Show Recording
The TiVo set-top box used by the panelists records one show at a time. Therefore, a newly recorded show
tn is assumed to have 1) higher expected flow utility than the show that is replaced (uSitn > u
S
itd); and 2)
higher expected flow utility than all shows that air at time t but are not recorded (uSitn > u
S
itn′,∀n′ 6= n).
As the show deleted is nearly always automatically selected by the set-top box, we refrain from using the
deletion choice decision.
Based on the flow utility specified in Equation 1, conditions 1 and 2 imply the probability that viewer
i records show tn is given by:
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(12) Pr
(
yRitn = 1
)
=
exp
(
u¯Sitn
)
∑n′ exp
(
u¯Sitn′
) ,
where yRitn is an indicator that show tn is recorded by viewer i.
TV Advertising Viewing
TV advertising avoidance differs between live and recorded viewing. In live viewing, advertising avoid-
ance involves switching away from the advertisement (zapping). Hence the viewer’s alternative set in-
cludes other shows. In contrast, almost all advertising avoidance when views are recorded involves for-
warding (zipping). Hence, the viewer’s alternative set includes the opportunity cost of time. Below, we
formalize these points.
Zapping. In the viewing model introduced above, the viewer can choose to avoid advertisements in
a live show by channel switching (zapping). Similar to show viewing where viewers can make channel
switching decisions during program content upon receiving an external shock, viewers make zapping
decisions during each advertisement. Hence, this component of the viewing model is analogous to the
watching model, except we observe the specific point at which the utility changes. The zapping decision
depends on the relative attractiveness of the advertisement as compared with shows on alternative networks
and the outside good, and the cost of zapping. The probability of zapping the live (L) advertisement tn can
be written as:
Pr
(
yALitn = 0 |
{
νSitn
}
n
,νOit
)
= Pr
(
u¯Aitn + ε
A
itn < max
{
u¯Oit +ν
O
it , ln
(
∑
n′∈Nit
exp
(
u¯Sitn′+ν
S
itn′
))}
− ci
)
= FεAitn
(
max
{
u¯Oit +ν
O
it , ln
(
∑
n′∈Nit
exp
(
u¯Sitn′+ν
S
itn′
))}
− ci− u¯Aitn
)
,(13)
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where yALitn is an indicator that the live advertisement tn is viewed (not zapped) by viewer i, and ci is the
zapping cost faced by viewer i.7 Computation of Pr
(
yALitn = 0
)
involves integrating out
{
νSitn
}
n and ν
O
it in
Pr
(
yALitn = 0 |
{
νSitn
}
n ,ν
O
it
)
.
Zipping. Because zipping reduces viewing time, the zipping decision is reached by comparing the flow
utility of the advertisement with that of the outside good. If the advertisement provides higher flow utility
than the outside good, the viewer watches it. The probability that viewer i zips a recorded (R) advertise-
ment tn is:
(14) Pr
(
yARitn = 0
)
=
exp
(
u¯Oit
)
exp
(
u¯Oit
)
+ exp
(
u¯Aitn
) ,
where yARitn is an indicator that the recorded advertisement tn is viewed (not zipped) by viewer i.
8
The observed show sampling and watching decisions, show recording decisions and advertising view-
ing decisions enable us to recover flow utilities of TV shows, TV advertisements, and the outside good.
We discuss estimation in the next section.
VIEWING MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
Estimation
The viewing model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. The likelihood is derived in Web
Appendix C, and is the product of likelihoods associated with sampling, watching conditional on sampling,
viewing length, recording, zapping, and zipping. We discuss model identification in Web Appendix C.
All parameters are viewer-specific as indicated by subscript i. We perform estimation viewer-by-
viewer, facilitated by the availability of panel data of relatively long cross-section and duration for each
7We consider two zapping costs — zapping during the show and zapping during the advertisement. Zapping costs can
reflect the cognitive cost associated with channel switching. For shows, this zapping cost cannot be separately identified from
the arrival rate of external shocks. A viewer that switches channels less often during a program can either have a low shock
arrival rate or a large channel-switching cost. However, for advertisements, the difference between zipping rates and zapping
rates is informative about the relative zipping and zapping costs, as we discuss in the next subsection.
8Theoretically, there can be a cost associated with zipping. However, it cannot be separately identified from the utility of the
outside good, so we normalize the zipping cost to zero. Thus the zapping cost in essence measures the relative cost of zapping
versus zipping, and is identified from the difference in zipping and zapping probabilities.
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viewer.9 Estimation data cover July 2005 to June 2006, while data from July 2006 is reserved for the
policy experiments.10
As virtually every viewer watches only a handful of available networks, we construct viewer-specific
consideration sets based on viewing history. For each viewer, the consideration set of networks consists of
the smallest number of networks that collectively account for at least 90% of prime-time viewing time. On
each viewing occasion, the choice set comprises the following two types of shows: 1) live shows that are
available on networks within the consideration set; and 2) shows stored on a set-top box that are recorded
either manually or through a season pass.
To limit the size of parameters governing show and advertising flow utilities (β Si and β
A
i ), we only
estimate flow utility parameters associated with the six most popular genres (drama, comedy, reality TV,
talk shows, news, and sports, together accounting for 68% of viewing time) and the six most popular
networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, USA, and Comedy Central, together accounting for 60% of viewing
time). There are 574 product categories in the advertising data. In an initial effort to capture the effects
of product category on advertising preference, we classify the 574 product categories into four general
categories: consumer packaged goods (CPG), services, pharmaceuticals, and other goods.
Results
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the viewing model. The second column reports the median (across
viewers) of parameter estimates in flow utilities of shows as well as the percentages of viewers with
significant positive and negative estimates (5% level). For most viewers, shorter shows are associated with
higher utility as indicated by 65.7% of people having a significant negative coefficient on “length”. As
expected, the average viewer prefers familiar shows, indicating a positive effect of episodes sampled in
the preceding week (“experience”) on show utility. State dependence is evidenced in network viewing
as indicated by the generally positive coefficients on “lag network”. The coefficients for “live” indicate
the average viewer prefers live shows over recorded shows. The negative coefficient for “viewing offset”
(which measures how far into a show a viewer starts watching) implies shows with less elapsed time from
9On average, there are 1,313 sampling occasions and 1,993 advertising viewing occasions per viewer.
10We performed several model validity checks using the hold-out sample of July 2006. Detailed results are available in Web
Appendix D.
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the start of the show is preferred. In other words, viewers prefer to watch shows in which they have missed
less content.
The third column of this table reports the median (across viewers) of parameter estimates in flow utili-
ties of advertisements, as well as the percentages of viewers with significant positive and negative estimates
(5% level). The coefficients for “first slot in a break” indicate the first advertisement in a commercial break
is less likely to be avoided, presumably because it takes viewers some time to initiate a forwarding action.
Most viewers have a positive coefficient for preceding commercial viewed, indicating state dependence in
advertising viewing and implying viewers forward blocks of advertisements successively.
[Table 3 about here.]
There also exists extensive heterogeneity in zapping cost across viewers, meaning some viewers do
not avoid live advertisements (and presumably are better targets than those that do). The mean, median,
and standard deviation of the zapping cost (c) are respectively 2.7, .9, and 4.7, and the 2.5% and 97.5%
quantiles are respectively .01 and 2.9.
Finally, the average estimated numbers of shocks per hour (λ ) are respectively .49, .66, 1.41, .63,
1.30, and 1.22 for drama, comedy, reality TV, talk shows, news, and sports. The average viewer is more
likely to switch channels during news and less likely during drama shows, perhaps due to differences in
program continuity; for example, news broadcasts are frequently punctuated by new stories. This finding
is consistent with Shachar and Emerson (2000)’s finding that viewing persistence is higher for dramas and
lower for news and sports.
Overall, there exists considerable heterogeneity across viewers in viewing preferences for genre, net-
work, and advertising. Heterogeneity in viewing preferences, together with heterogeneity in advertising
response, suggests the potential gains available from advertising targeting.
ADVERTISING TARGETING
This section conducts advertising targeting policy experiments. We first link advertising viewing with
sales response. Predicated on viewing behavior and advertising response, we discuss various targeting
strategies.
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Advertising Response
To measure advertising response, we select seven product categories evidencing high variation in adver-
tising and sales: children’s yogurt, children’s cereal, regular cola, diet cola, sports drink, toothpaste, and
bathroom tissue. These categories are regularly purchased and frequently advertised, with high cross-
sectional and temporal variation in both purchase and advertising. Within these categories, we consider
22 leading brands that have non-negligible unit market share and that advertised during the sample period.
For more detail on these purchase data refer to Web Appendix E.
Within any given category, the utility household i obtains from purchasing brand j ( j = 1, . . . ,J) of
category c in shopping trip m is given by:
(15) UPi jm = Zi jmθic +hic
(
Ai jm
)
+ εPi jm,
where Zi jm is a vector that includes a brand fixed effect, the price of brand j at shopping trip m, an indicator
of whether brand j is on promotion (either display or feature) at shopping trip m, and an indicator of
whether household i purchased brand j in the previous category purchase. The function hic
(
Ai jm
)
captures
the advertising effect.11 Finally, εPi jm is an idiosyncratic error term affecting the inherent valuation of brand
j at shopping trip m, and it is observed by the household but not by the researcher.
The function hic
(
Ai jm
)
is assumed to be linear in advertising views (though advertising effects are not
linear owing to the logit-based demand system we use):
(16) hic
(
Ai jm
)
=
A
∑
a=1
NAi jamγi jac +
(
NAi jm−
A
∑
a=1
NAi jam
)
γi j0c,
where a ∈ {1, . . . ,A} indexes advertising creatives (as defined in the subsection entitled “TNS Advertising
Schedule Data”), and NAi jam is household i’s number of views on advertising creative a since the previous
11Firms may target households that are more responsive to advertising. To address this potential endogeneity concern, we
compute for each household and each brand: 1) the brand’s share in the household’s category purchase; and 2) the brand’s
share in the household’s category advertisement exposure. We do not find a correlation between the two variables, implying the
advertising variables are unlikely to be endogenous. This lack of correlation might be a consequence of the current targeting
practice, and implies the potential for improvement. In addition, the between-household variance of advertising exposure is
lower than the within-household variance. For the 22 brands in the sample, the mean and median portions of the total variance
between households are respectively 20.1% and 15.9%, with the lowest being 4.0% and the highest being 47.9%.
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category purchase or in the past seven days, whichever is smaller.12 We combine creatives with a smaller
number of views as they are individually likely to have a negligible effect on demand. In particular, if
NAi jm is household i’s total number of advertising views across brand j
′s creatives during this window, then
NAi jm−∑Aa=1 NAi jam represents the total number of views on all other creatives with fewer views. Equation 16
allows us to measure creative-specific effects for major creatives (e.g., Malaviya, Kisielius, and Sternthal
1996; Tellis et al. 2005) while pooling the effect of the smaller creatives.
The utility associated with the outside good (i.e., no purchase) is given by:
(17) UPi0m = ε
P
i0m.
Assuming the idiosyncratic error terms to be i.i.d. standard Type I Extreme Value distributed, the
probability that household i chooses brand j in shopping trip m is:
(18) Pr
(
yPi jm = 1
)
=
exp
(
Zi jmθic +hic
(
Ai jm
))
1+∑Jj′=1 exp
(
Zi j′mθic +hic
(
Ai j′m
)) .
Using a latent class model (Kamakura and Russell 1989) to capture household heterogeneity, the prob-
ability that household i in segment k (k = 1, . . . ,K) chooses brand j in shopping trip m is:
(19) Pr
(
yPi jm = 1 | i ∈ k
)
=
exp
(
Zi jmθkc +hkc
(
Ai jm
))
1+∑Jj′=1 exp
(
Zi j′mθkc +hkc
(
Ai j′m
)) ,
where hkc
(
Ai jm
)≡ ∑Aa=1 NAi jamγk jac +(NAi jm−∑Aa=1 NAi jam)γk j0c.
The model is separately estimated for each product category, resulting in a unique set of advertising
coefficients across product categories, consumer segments, and advertising creatives. To assess whether
advertising affects sales, Figure 6 plots the histogram of the asymptotic t-statistics of the estimated ad-
vertising coefficients.13 As in prior research, advertising effects are statistically small, but when they are
distinguishable from zero, they are mostly positive. Were advertising effect zero, the distribution of the
asymptotic t-statistics would follow a standard normal distribution (per the Central Limit Theorem). A
12We use a seven-day window as this typically represents two shopping trips, enhancing the likelihood one can attribute a
given view to a purchase decision on a given shopping trip, akin to last touch attribution.
13Detailed estimation results are available from the authors.
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one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis that the asymptotic t-statistics follow a stan-
dard normal distribution (p < .07), indicating that advertising effects overall are statistically greater than
zero.14 To assess the external validity of our findings, we compare the percent of estimated advertising
effects that are significant at different p-values, and compare that percentage with the percentages reported
by existing review papers on advertising effects. The results are reported in Table 4, and are generally in
line with previous findings.
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
To assess the magnitude of advertising effects that are significant (at the level of 10%), we simulate
the effect of removing the associated advertising creative on sales. Following Sethuraman, Tellis, and
Briesch (2011) who find, on average, the long-term advertising elasticity is twice as high as the short-term
elasticity, we measure both short- and long-term effect. The short-term effect is obtained by simulating
contemporaneous changes in market share, holding all else constant. The long-term effect takes into
account not only the immediate effect of eliminating the advertising creative, but also the carry-over effect
of altered choice through the purchase event feedback measure (whether the consumer purchased the brand
in the previous purchase).15
[Figure 7 about here.]
Figure 7 depicts the results in terms of percentage changes in market share for those creatives with
statistically significant ad effects. The length of the black segment of each bar represents the short-term
effect, and the total length of the bar represents the long-term effect. As shown in the figure, the change
is negative for the majority (18 out of 22) of consumer segment-creative pairs. Among such pairs, the
14At the level of 5%, 19 out of 129 consumer segment-creative pairs are significantly positive at p = .05 (15%), and four are
significantly negative (3%). Thus, negative effects are slightly less than one might expect by chance, while positive effects are
substantially larger.
15Specifically, we first compute the purchase probability for each brand in the consumer’s first observed shopping trip with
and without an advertising creative, and simulate a purchase decision based on these probabilities. Then, using the purchase
event feedback term (lag brand purchase), we compute consumers’ purchase probabilities in the second shopping trip. We
continue this process until the last observed shopping trip, thereby obtaining a new purchase sequence for each consumer. The
entire process is repeated 100 times for each consumer, and the new market share is obtained by averaging the simulated market
shares obtained under the 100 simulations. The effect of advertising is then the difference between simulated long-term effects
with and without an advertising creative.
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combined short-term and long-term changes in own market share due to elimination of creatives vary
from −5.5% to −.4%, suggesting the long-term effects of an advertising execution are not insubstantial.
Overall, we conclude that the significant advertising effects are generally positive, but small, as in the
previous literature (e.g., Sethuraman, Tellis, and Briesch 2011).16
Targeting Approaches
Currently, national TV networks typically sell advertising inventory in advance by show. In the upfront
market, advertisers purchase advertising across a show or set of shows for the entire season. Procurement
involves a negotiated cost per thousand viewers (CPM) with performance targets for specific periods and
programs. While the TV network lists available commercial space by show and air date, the exact location
of the advertisement’s placement within the show is determined at a later stage. Advertising prices vary
with the number of viewers in a show as well as the demographic mix.
Digital distribution offers two further advances upon the upfront model. First, this technology allows
advertisers to buy users instead of shows. As the viewing and advertising avoidance models outlined in the
section entitled “TV Viewing Model” enable advertisers to forecast which shows will be viewed by their
target audience, this suggests the potential of our approach to enhance the efficiency of advertising buys
in upfront markets. Second, advertisements can be inserted real-time, analogous to current practices in
Internet advertising. In this case, the advertiser observes all information at the time immediately preceding
the available advertising slot. This information set includes the show watched just before the ad airs (and
at the time of the commercial break). Thus, in the real-time case, the advertiser knows the TV is on and the
consumer is watching a show when the slot appears, whereas in the advance buy case, these two decisions
are only known up to the model’s ability to forecast them.17
Several metrics can be employed when targeting. At the simplest level, one can either maximize target
views for a given budget or minimize a budget for a given view. The advantage of these metrics is that
they do not require a model of advertising response or sales data to implement. In our analysis, we focus
on minimizing a budget for a given view. At a more complex level, one can consider the role of profits or
16In Web Appendix E, we apply a “model-free” approach to measure advertising effects, which does not involve assumptions
regarding functional form, advertising decay, etc. We also find small but positive advertising effects.
17Unlike display advertising, where ads and content are coincident (i.e., appear on the same page), ads and content are
sequential in television advertising. Thus, it is not possible to guarantee ex-ante (at the start of a pod) that a consumer will
watch the subsequent ad as would be possible for display ads.
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revenues. At the cost of invoking an advertising response model and collecting additional sales data, one
can improve the returns to advertising.
Table 5 summarizes the foregoing discussion by classifying the targeted advertising approaches into
advance or real-time buy and the associated performance metrics into costs or profit. Different cells utilize
different model outputs and data. The upper left cell uses the viewing data and the advertising viewing
model; the upper right cell uses the viewing and sales data and the advertising viewing model and sales
response model; the bottom cells use not only data and models in the respective cell above, but also the
show viewing model. Hence they have the most substantial data and computational requirements.18
[Table 5 about here.]
We explore these policies using the leading brand of bathroom tissue, Charmin, over the hold-out
period of July 2006.19 Our analyses abstract away from competitive response (from the retailers, the
competitors, or the networks), and assume a fixed (per-exposure) advertising price to a show. Thus, the
findings are best interpreted as a marginal improvement in advertising, holding all else fixed. While this
assumption is reasonable when considering changes in purchases by a single advertiser, a more systematic
change in policy would require an assessment of how advertising rates might change in response to new
targeting capabilities, and how the advertiser’s competitors might adjust their own advertising schedules
in response. While a fruitful area for additional research, this analysis extends beyond the scope of this
paper, and we interpret our results in light of this caveat.
Cost-based real-time buy. We first consider the potential for Charmin to lower its per-view cost (views
differ from exposures inasmuch exposures need not be viewed). To do this, we first compute each targeted
household’s observed average per-exposure advertising cost, by averaging the total observed advertising
costs across all exposures to that household in the holdout data. Next, we compute the predicted cost per
18In Web Appendix F, we also consider an aggregate-level targeting approach wherein advertisers can only buy shows and
not users. This corresponds to current practice. Results indicate that leveraging household viewing information substantially
increases advertising efficiency even in this aggregated case.
19We focus on bathroom tissue as it has broad penetration. Within this category, we focus on Charmin as it has the largest
number of advertising views (share = 46.8%) and the second largest sales (share = 24.1%). As a result, there is sufficient infor-
mation from which to infer advertising response. In the hold-out period of July 2006, the 834 sample households viewed 690 of
Charmin’s advertisements at a total cost of $8.77. In the profit-based simulations, we consider Charmin’s advertising creative
“Mega roll/bear changes roll”, which has significant effect on one consumer segment (est = .46, se = .16) and insignificant
effect on the other segment (est = .05, se = .20). As a result of the heterogeneity in advertising response, targeting should be
more efficacious.
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view by dividing the total observed advertising costs for a household by the predicted viewership. For
example, if there are 2,000 exposures and 1,000 views to household i, and the placement costs $500, then
the average cost per-exposure (denoted ci) is $500/2,000 = $.25, and average cost per view (denoted c?i )
is $500/1,000 = $.50. Fifty parameter draws from the vector of parameter estimates are used to predict
viewing probabilities.
Denote the predicted cost for a particular show’s views on network n at time t to household i as c?itn,
which is the ratio of the view’s exposure cost and its predicted viewing probability. Intuitively, if c?itn < c
?
i ,
then a more efficient allocation of expenditures is feasible in terms of cost per view by reallocating ad
dollars to show tn. Therefore, a parsimonious rule for the advertiser would be to set a level K, conditioned
on the information available at time t, such that the advertiser purchases an advertising slot in show tn if
c?itn < Kc
?
i . For example, a rule of K = 1 implies the advertiser should buy all slots with a per-view cost
that is lower than the average cost per view under the current schedule. Lower values of K imply a rule that
leads to higher levels of purchase efficiency, but at the cost of reach (there will be only a limited number
of slots that meet an increasingly stringent cutoff). We implement this purchase rule viewer-by-viewer,
beginning at the first advertising slot in the period and ending when either a) the period has ended, or b)
both advertising views and expenditures under the new rule exceed those observed in the data.20
Figure 8 portrays the total advertising views and costs (across households) under different values of
K. In the figure, we note that total advertising costs decrease as K decreases. This is primarily because
a lower value for K means that Charmin is buying advertisements that have lower costs per view, and
because fewer advertising slots are available that meet this criterion. The effect of decreasing K on views
is more complex. On the one hand, a decrease in K means fewer slots are available that meet that criteria
of lower cost per view (as K goes to 0, there will be no advertising). This implies reduced views owing to
reduced reach. On the other hand, there is the potential that lower cost per view can lead to more views
because one can buy more views for a fixed budget (with sufficient inventory available). How these two
opposing forces trade off is an empirical question.
Findings suggest that when K is set below .6 (implying high cost-efficiency constraint on ad buys),
advertising views surpass those under the current schedule (690) even though overall advertising costs are
below the current level ($8.77, or $12.71 CPM). For example, when K = .4, Charmin’s views are increased
20A generalization of this purchase rule is to soften either the minimum advertising views or the maximum budget constraints.
This exercise yields similar insights as described below.
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by 2% while its costs are decreased by 41%; when K = .6, Charmin’s views are increased by 47% while
its costs are decreased by 7%. Charmin buys fewer advertisements, but the advertisements cost less and
are more likely to be seen. Thus it is possible to lower costs and increase views. To maintain the same
number of views (690), the cost is even lower. For instance, when K = .4, the CPM is $7.38, 41% lower
than the current level; when K = .6, the CPM is $7.99, 37% lower than the current level.
Of additional interest is the decomposition of real-time buy cost-efficiency gains into 1) gains from
placing advertisements in shows that have lower cost per exposure (i.e., reducing cost) and 2) gains arising
from targeting advertisements to those who are less likely to avoid them (i.e., increasing views). To
answer this question, we replace the model’s forecasted advertising avoidance (denoted forecasted) with
the average observed advertising avoidance rate across viewers (denoted observed); we then use observed
to re-impute advertising costs and views under the simple buying rule. Setting K = .4, our first finding is
that it is no longer the case that views increase and costs decrease under observed (i.e., no heterogeneity
in ad avoidance); instead, both increase. Second, the average costs per view in the observed data is 1.27
cents, .73 cents under forecasted, and .94 cents under observed. Thus, show placement alone yields a 26%
improvement in cost efficiency over the observed schedule, but coupled with the advertisement viewing
model there is a 43% improvement. In other words, roughly 2/5 of the improvement in efficiency is due to
reducing advertising avoidance and the other 3/5 is due to cheaper impressions.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Cost-based advance buy. In this targeting scenario, the advertiser purchases advertising slots in advance
for a given period, minimizing the total cost of expected views for targeted households. In other words,
advertisers are unable to condition on current viewing, meaning that they need to predict show viewing as
well as advertising viewing.21, 22
For each household i, the advertiser selects shows that can (in expectation) maintain the total advertis-
ing views under the current schedule at the lowest cost. The optimization problem can be written as:
Min {xitn}t,n ∑
t
∑
n
ctnx?itn(20)
s.t. x?itn ∈ {0,1} ,∀t,n,(21)
21Because almost all recorded shows arise from automated recording, the automated list is used to predict the shows that will
be recorded.
22We assume no network guarantee on minimal views to advertisers as sometimes happens in practice. Web Appendix G
considers an extension that includes rating guarantees, i.e., advertisers pay for guaranteed views instead of exposures.
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EΘi
(
∑
t
∑
n
x?itnritn
)
≥ EΘi
(
∑
t
∑
n
xitnritn
)
,(22)
where Equation 20 represents the expected cost of advertising under schedule {x?itn}. The x?itn denote
household-show selection under the optimal schedule where x?itn = 1 if show tn is selected for household
i, x?itn = 0 otherwise. Similarly, xitn ∈ {0,1} denotes household-show selection under the current schedule.
ctn denotes the per-exposure advertising price associated with show tn. ritn is the probability that household
i watches the advertisement placed in show tn. The constraint in Equation 22 ensures that the firm is mini-
mizing costs for the same viewers as it currently targets. The expectations in Equation 22 are taken over the
distribution of ritn, which is associated with the advertising viewing estimates, Θi ≡ {β si ,βOi ,βAi ,λi,ci}.
ritn is obtained from the viewing model output as the product of sampling the show, watching the show, and
not exiting the show before the advertisement appears, and takes into account the uncertainty in advertising
location within the show:
ritn = Pr
(
ySitn = 1
)
Pr
(
yWitn = 1 | ySitn = 1
)
(23)
×
(∫
t ′
Pr
(
lWitn ≥ t ′
)
Pr
(
yAit ′n = 1
)
f
(
t ′
)
dt ′
)
,
where t ′ denotes a possible advertising location (time into show) and f (t ′) represents the probability
density function of a uniform distribution, whose support is advertising pods in show tn. Assuming zero
viewing offset, conditional on watching show tn, household i will be exposed to the advertisement placed
at t ′ if the viewing length lWitn exceeds t
′. Pr
(
yAit ′n = 1
)
denotes the probability that this advertisement will
not be zapped (if the show is live) or zipped (if the show is recorded).
Because EΘi (∑t∑n x
?
tnritn) = ∑t∑n x?tnEΘi (ritn), we first compute EΘi (ritn) by simulation,
23 and then
use it to solve the optimization problem for each household. The average per-view advertising price
reduces from 8.0 cents to .7 cents. The overall cost reduces from $8.77 to $.72, a 92% reduction in
expenses. The cost reduction per 1,000 households is $9.65.
Profit-based real-time buy. To ascertain the effect of advertising on profits, we compare the marginal
effect of advertising to a given household to its cost. A profitable buy is one wherein the marginal revenue
exceeds the cost.
23Specifically, we draw 50 sets of household-specific parameter estimates, each leading to a prediction of the household’s
show choices and viewing length conditional on choice. EΘi (ritn) is taken as the average of this predicted viewership across the
50 sets of parameter draws.
31
Incremental profits from advertising are computed using the estimates from the advertising response
model described in the subsection entitled “Advertising Response”. Following Equation 18, the effect of
a view of creative a on household i’s purchase probability for brand j in shopping trip m is:24
∆i jm = Pr
(
yPi jm = 1 | NAi jam = 1
)
−Pr
(
yPi jm = 1 | NAi jam = 0
)
(24)
=
exp
(
Zi jmθi +hi
(
Ai jm | NAi jam = 1
))
1+∑Jj′=1 exp
(
Zi j′mθi +hi
(
Ai j′m | NAi jam = 1
)) − exp
(
Zi jmθi +hi
(
Ai jm | NAi jam = 0
))
1+∑Jj′=1 exp
(
Zi j′mθi +hi
(
Ai j′m | NAi jam = 0
)) ,
where the first term represents sales with advertising and the second term indicates sales without advertis-
ing.
The lift yields incremental unit sales, not profits. As we do not observe unit margins, we solve for
the incremental profit under different unit dollar margins l.25 The expected incremental profit of adver-
tisement tn is calculated as Pr
(
yAitn = 1
)
∆i jml− ctn, where Pr
(
yAitn = 1
)
denotes the probability that the
advertisement will not be avoided, and ctn is the cost of advertising slot tn. Advertisement tn is purchased
for household i if its expected incremental profit is positive.
Panel a of Figure 9 depicts the simulated profits and ROI (defined as profit per ad dollar invested) under
the observed and proposed advertising schedules for different margins. The simulated short-term adver-
tising profit using the observed schedule is negative, with losses of about $8.70 across the 834 households
in our sample. In contrast, the proposed schedule produces a positive simulated incremental profit (the net
gain ranges from $2.84 to $11.59). The net gain for 1,000 households ranges from $3.41 to $13.90.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Further insights into this gain can be obtained by decomposing three factors driving the expected
advertising lift, Pr
(
yAitn = 1
)
∆i jml−ctn: 1) reducing avoidance (i.e., increasing Pr
(
yAitn = 1
)
); 2) targeting
people with higher advertising response (i.e., increasing ∆i jm); and 3) shifting to cheaper impressions (i.e.,
decreasing ctn). Factors 1) and 3) lower the cost of advertising, whereas factor 2) increases the revenue.
To achieve this aim, we recompute profit gains under three alternative scenarios. In Model A, forecasted
advertising avoidance is replaced by the average observed avoidance rate across viewers. In Model B,
estimated advertising response is replaced by the average observed advertising response across viewers. In
24Product category subscript is omitted for simplicity.
25Bathroom tissue has a gross profit margin of roughly 13%. In the data, the mean and median prices of Charmin are
respectively $6.80 and $6.30, leading to a unit dollar margin of about $.80 – .90.
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Model C, advertising cost is replaced by the average observed advertising cost across slots. The difference
in profits between the constrained models A-C and the respective models where these effects vary across
users yields the gains from targeting for each respective component (reducing avoidance, increasing ad
response, and lowering costs). Panel b of Figure 9 depicts this profit decomposition under different unit
dollar margins. Depending on margin, the majority (75 – 89%) of gain comes from targeting people with
higher advertising response, about 9 – 19% of gain comes from reducing advertising avoidance, and the
remaining comes from improvement in cost efficiency. The finding that the greatest increase in profits
accrues to increasing revenue by targeting those most responsive to advertising suggests the value of
single-source data. Combining purchase data with viewing leads to the greatest share of profit gains.
Profit-based advance buy. The profit-based advance buy scenario requires advertisers to forecast show
viewership, advertising viewership, and sales. On an intuitive level one might expect that this information
requirement lowers the efficacy of advertising, because more advertisements will be aired to those who do
not see them. As this statistical uncertainty reduces the expected advertising response, but not advertising
expense, one might expect advertising to become less effective (thereby leading to lower optimal levels
of advertising). More formally, as noted in the subsection entitled “Profit-based Real-time Buy”, the ex-
pected incremental profit from an advertisement is Pr
(
yAitn = 1
)
∆i jml− ctn. In advance buy, this expected
incremental profit becomes ritn∆i jml−ctn, with ritn defined in Equation 23. Advertisement tn is purchased
for household i if its expected incremental profit is positive.
Implementing this optimization, we find overall spending reduces to zero. In expectation, most adver-
tising is unprofitable because of relatively low advertising elasticities coupled with little attendant diminu-
tion in media costs. Hence, in contrast to real-time purchases, the optimal advertising levels decrease.
Targeting summary. The targeting results are summarized in Table 6. Results suggest there are large
percentage-wise decreases in costs and increases in views possible as a result of improved targeting, and
that major gains can accrue when shifting to real-time buys. Further, short-term profits can be increased
by targeting people with higher advertising response, selecting advertising slots with higher viewing prob-
ability, and shifting to cheaper impressions. Of note, the allocation of surplus among multiple advertisers
and TV networks in the long run depends on competition in both the product market and the advertising
market, as well as the advertising pricing and allocation mechanisms. For instance, if TV networks were
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able to raise their price in the profit-based real-time buy scenario, then they could extract all surplus from
the advertiser. The average per-view price increase feasible to the network is therefore obtained by divid-
ing the profit difference between the optimal schedule and the current schedule with the number of ads
under the optimal schedule. This calculation implies that prices could be 44 – 68% higher than the current
level.
[Table 6 about here.]
We conclude by noting several additional caveats pertaining to the profit-based targeting approaches.
First, household-level scanner data comprise only a fraction of the viewers, and therefore might not be
wholly representative of all consumers. Second, single-source data are costly to develop as multiple
companies own different pieces of the data, making the integration of these data sources difficult. Third,
the purchase data used in this study are limited to consumer packaged goods, and therefore the degree to
which our findings generalize to other categories remains unclear. Nonetheless, our preliminary findings
suggest that additional investment might be warranted to address these concerns.
CONCLUSION
TV remains by far the predominant form for the transmission and reception of video content, and the
largest advertising medium. Moreover, its preeminence stands to benefit from recent digital innovations
such as DVRs and STBs. Yet digital TV is both a blessing and a curse for advertisers. On the one
hand, set-top boxes have greatly enhanced viewers’ TV-viewing experiences, leading to increased viewing
consumption and the opportunity to target advertising at the TV-set level. On the other hand, these boxes
enable viewers to forward past advertisements. It is our goal to redress this limit by taking advantage
of micro-level viewing data and micro-targeting capabilities inherent in set-top boxes to better understand
viewer behavior and accordingly improve the efficacy of advertising. If targeting proves effective, so called
“programmatic television” opens new paths to TV advertising pricing by allowing TV networks and cable
companies to sell “boxes” as well as shows to advertisers.
To better assess the nature of advertising consumption, we use set-top data to characterize viewing be-
havior, and purchase data to link ad viewing to purchase. Viewing behaviors involve a series of conditional
decisions that lead to an ad exposure: whether to watch TV and for how long, which show to watch and
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for how long, and whether to watch ads within those shows. Our first finding is that most viewers watch
their TV most of the evening. This means variation in ad exposure is more a function of the show chosen
than the decision to watch TV. Second, we find that viewers tend to sample shows before selecting them,
and once a show is selected, they tend to watch to the end. This suggests that switching away from ads
in live viewing contexts is not the modal behavior. However, when the selected show is recorded, it is the
norm to forward through advertisements on the way to the completion of the show. Combined, these two
observations suggest that targeting ads to persons who watch live leads to higher viewership. Third, we
find that the preponderance of variation in ad avoidance is explained by person-level factors, suggesting
that 1) gains from targeting might be considerable and 2) targeting by shows, the current norm, limits ad-
vertiser ability to prevent ad avoidance (within shows, news and reality shows exhibit the most switching,
while drama exhibits the least). Last, we find advertising effects to be small and positive, consistent with
previous research (Lodish et al. 1995), and that there is heterogeneity in ad response across consumers.
This suggests the potential to improve targeting by reaching responsive consumers.
Given the potential benefits from targeting, we consider several household-level targeting scenarios by
manipulating: 1) whether the objective function is to minimize costs for a given set of views or to maximize
incremental profit from advertising; and 2) whether the advertising purchase is made in advance or in real-
time. Results indicate micro-targeting can lower advertising costs and raise incremental profit even in the
face of ad avoidance. We find that the greatest potential to increase the profitability of advertising arises
from 1) the integration of purchase data with viewing data and 2) the ability to buy placements in real-
time instead of in advance. As for the former, single source data are becoming increasingly available and
purveyed by firms such as Axciom TV. As for the latter, there is a developing advertising ecosystem that
could enable real-time buying as is commonly observed in display advertising (wywy 2016). Our analysis
suggests the importance of these technological advances.
Several extensions are possible. First, the sales model does not consider context effects in advertising.
As a result, the proposed targeting strategies do not account for context effects. Consumer behavior
research suggests advertisements placed within a program of dissimilar content are recalled significantly
better than if placed within a program of similar content (e.g., Furnham and Price 2006). One extension is
to incorporate context effects in measuring advertising effectiveness, and apply it in designing the targeting
strategies.
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Second, the targeting strategies we propose do not take into account potential complementarities be-
tween the consumption of goods and advertisements (Becker and Murphy 1993). According to a recent
study by Tuchman, Nair, and Gardete (2016), the quantity of the advertised product purchased recently
can explain the advertising avoidance rates. They suggest that advertising efficacy would depend on the
compliance of the targeted households, and the firm can target the subset of households whose purchases
and welfare will likely change in response to the advertising campaign.
Third, the targeting strategies are designed based on an integrated channel structure, under which
advertisers and TV networks share the same information and same objectives. Therefore, a limitation
is that we are unable to model the pricing mechanism and the advertising allocation problem from the
TV networks’ perspective. We do this because advertising allocation can be designed to align networks’
and advertisers’ incentives (e.g., Wilbur, Xu, and Kempe 2013). Still, another extension is to consider
strategic interactions between advertisers and TV networks and how they affect gains available from micro-
targeting.
Fourth, with minor modifications, our model can also be applied in various other contexts, such as
media consumption in an online environment and with mobile devices. For example, in such contexts,
viewers in general face a larger choice set because they can sample shows whenever they want. In addition,
some tablet options do not allow viewers to avoid advertisements, and so the viewing behavior can be
modeled by eliminating advertising viewing decision.
Finally, future research can extend micro-targeting by taking into account competitive response and
allowing for re-optimization of advertising and product prices. Owing to the growth in digital TV, we
believe these and other extensions will yield economically consequential insights in the coming years.
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FIGURE 1
DESCRIPTIVES ON TV VIEWING
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FIGURE 2
ADVERTISING VIEWING AND AVOIDANCE
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FIGURE 4
MODEL OVERVIEW
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FIGURE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ASYMPTOTIC T-STATISTICS OF ESTIMATED ADVERTISING
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Scott ad − People whisper while at work
Crest ad − Lemon ice/Emeril Lagasse uses product 
Crest ad − Women chase after icecream truck
Colgate ad −Side−by−side product comparison
Gatorade ad − Stadium / baseball & soccer / cricket
Gatorade ad − Chris Leigh collapses in triathalon
Powerade DG− People are catapulted toward goalposts
 −5         −4   −3          −2  −1           0                 1                  2 
Percent change in brand market share if the creative was canceled
Short term
Long term − Short term
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FIGURE 8
ADVERTISING VIEWS AND COSTS UNDER DIFFERENT PURCHASE THRESHOLDS (K). THE
CURRENT OBSERVED COST IS $8.77 WITH 690 VIEWS AND 780 EXPOSURES.
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FIGURE 9
REAL-TIME BUY SIMULATED GAINS FOR SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS UNDER DIFFERENT UNIT
DOLLAR MARGINS
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TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ADVERTISING SKIPPING (RECORDED SHOWS WATCHED
DURING 8 P.M. – MIDNIGHT, N = 6,401,894)
Source DF Type I SS Mean
Square
F Value Pr > F % Variance
Household 777 113065.5 145.5 1160.6 < .0001 20.4%
Brand 1920 1586.4 .8 6.6 < .0001 .3%
Genre 14 4135.9 295.4 2356.2 < .0001 .7%
Network 55 2129.1 38.7 308.7 < .0001 .4%
Product category 573 168.6 .3 2.4 < .0001 .0%
Pod 27 3964.1 146.8 1171.0 < .0001 .7%
Pod position (Slot) 33 415.7 12.6 100.5 < .0001 .1%
Day of week 6 83.8 14.0 111.5 < .0001 .0%
Hour 3 114.0 38.0 303.0 < .0001 .0%
Prior ad avoided 1 65691.3 65691.3 523923.0 < .0001 11.9%
TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF PER-EXPOSURE ADVERTISING PRICE BASED ON NIELSEN
RATINGS (JULY 2006)
Network Number of
Observations
Mean Median S.D.
ABC 94 .011 .010 .005
CBS 102 .012 .011 .004
NBC 93 .011 .010 .006
FOX 87 .015 .014 .010
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TABLE 3
FLOW UTILITY PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR SHOWS (β S) AND ADVERTISEMENTS (βA)
Show Advertisement
Variable Median Est (% Positive, %
Negative, 5% level))
Median Est (% Positive, %
Negative, 5% level))
Show length −.20 (1.2%, 65.7%)
Episodes sampled in preceding week .83 (49.5%, 15.9%)
Lag network .63 (67.6%, 1.9%)
Live 9.79 (79.9%, .0%)
Viewing offset −4.96 (.0%, 82.0%)
Prior ad viewed 5.23 (66.6%, .6%)
First ad break −.11 (6.4%, 16.3%)
Last ad break .05 (11.3%, 10.8%)
First slot in a break 1.51 (55.3%, 1.0%)
Last slot in a break −.11 (3.8%, 7.3%)
Genre: Drama −.21 (12.9%, 34.2%) −.77 (9.0%, 25.9%)
Genre: Comedy −.47 (8.2%, 48.2%) −.10 (8.8%, 15.2%)
Genre: Reality TV −.74 (6.4%, 48.4%) −.78 (8.6%, 24.7%)
Genre: Talk shows .26 (34.7%, 15.9%) .30 (7.6%, 10.2%)
Genre: News .23 (32.3%, 12.8%) −.10 (7.8%, 11.4%)
Genre: Sports −.25 (13.7%, 24.6%) −.15 (7.3%, 15.2%)
Network: ABC .81 (45.6%, 11.5%) −.03 (12.5%, 16.7%)
Network: CBS .33 (33.6%, 20.0%) −.14 (10.9%, 15.3%)
Network: NBC .50 (40.3%, 19.3%) −.18 (11.2%, 17.5%)
Network: FOX .24 (24.9%, 15.2%) −.14 (10.0%, 12.9%)
Network: USA −.09 (9.0%, 10.8%) −.22 (6.0%, 6.8%)
Network: Comedy Central −.12 (8.4%, 8.2%) .78 (4.4%, 2.0%)
Product category: CPG −.02 (4.0%, 4.2%)
Product category: service .01 (4.8%, 3.6%)
Product category: drug −.09 (2.0%, 5.3%)
TABLE 4
PERCENT OF SIGNIFICANT ADVERTISING EFFECTS
P = .05 P = .2 P = .4
Eastlack and Rao (1989) 24%
Lodish et al. (1995) 55% for new products;
36% for established brands
Hu, Lodish, and Krieger (2007) 39% before 1995;
45% after 1995
This study 15% 21% 36%
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TABLE 5
TARGETING SCENARIOS AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
Cost-based Profit-based
Real-time Buy Ad Viewing Model Ad Viewing Model
Sales Response Model
Advance Buy Ad Viewing Model
Show Viewing Model
Ad Viewing Model
Sales Response Model
Show Viewing Model
TABLE 6
TARGETING GAINS
Cost-based Profit-based
Real-time Target views increase 47% and
costs decrease 7%; alternatively
costs decrease 37% for same target
views
Profits per thousand increase from
$−10.4 to $3.4 – $13.9. Normed to
a ROI of −100%, this increase
implies a ROI of 108% – 139%
Advance Costs decrease 92% for same target
views
Negligible spending and profit
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